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TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-LIABILITY OF UNITED STATES FOR 
NEGLIGENCE OF GOVERNMENT FIREMEN-Plaintiff brought suit under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act1 against the United States for damages resulting 
from the negligence of the United States Forest Service in combating a 
fire that destroyed plaintiff's property. The Forest Service had entered 
into an agreement with the State of Washington to prevent and suppress 
any fires in the area in which plaintiff's land was situated. The federal 
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action 
and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari, to the United States 
Supreme Court, held, judgment vacated and case remanded to the district 
court for trial. The United States is liable under the act for the negli-
gence of government fire fighters in the performance of their duties. 
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act federal courts were given juris-
diction to hear claims when the United States, "if a private person, would 
be liable ... in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred."2 The act also states that the government shall be 
liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private in-
dividual under like circumstances."3 It was argued in behalf of the gov-
ernment in the principal case that there were no "like circumstances" 
within the statutory meaning because private individuals do not enter 
into the activity of organized fire-fighting.4 In the absence of identical 
individual activity, the government reasoned that the act imposed liabil-
ity only under circumstances where governmental bodies are traditionally 
responsible for the negligence of their agents. The law of municipal 
128 U.S.C. (1952) §§1346 (b) and 2671-2680. 
2 28 u.s.c. (1952) §1346 (b). 
3 Id., §2674. 
4 Precedent for this theory under the act can be found in Feres v. United States, 340 
U.S. 135 (1950), in which a soldier's executrix was denied recovery against the govern-
ment for the negligent death of her husband. The Court could find no analogous private 
tort liability "for no private individual has power to conscript or mobilize a private army." 
(p. 141) This decision can be distinguished on. the distinctly federal relationship involved 
and the adequacy of the compensation the executrix would receive as a serviceman's 
widow. See the court's discussion at 145. 
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corporations generally immunizes local governments from suits arising 
from the negligence of firemen by classifying the activity as a governmental 
function as distinguished from a proprietary function.5 The government 
contended that a similar immunity should extend to the United States 
in its operation of the Forest Service.6 There is language of the Supreme 
Court to support this position in Dalehite v. United States,7 a case in which 
the Court rejected a tort claim based in part upon the negligence of the 
Coast Guard in fighting a fire.s The major issue in the Dalehite case re-
volved around the "discretionary functions" exception in the act.9 On 
the facts of the present case, Dalehite'~ analysis of the "discretionary func-
tions" provision is undisturbed, but it seems equally clear that the portion 
of the Dalehite opinion that denies a cause of action for the negligence 
of the Coast Guard in fighting fires is no longer the law. The present rul-
ing relies on recent significant precedent10 in refusing to apply the 
"governmental-proprietary" distinction, argued for by the government. 
The decision points up the fact that use of this artificial distinction im-
ported from another area of the law conflicts with congressional intent.11 
After thirty years' consideration, Congress passed the act with numerous 
5 Stated simply, the distinction rests on the theory that "a municipal corporation is 
liable for torts committed by its agents in the performance of private, proprietary, cor-
porate or ministerial functions but, in the absence of statute, is not responsible for torts 
committed in the performance of governmental functions." Smith, "Municipal Tort 
Liability," 48 MICH. L. REv. 41 at 43 (1949). 
6 This reasoning was approved by the court of appeals. Rayonier, Inc. v. United 
States, (9th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 642. 
7 346 U.S. 15 (1953). This litigation arose from the explosion and fire at Texas City, 
Texas. See N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1947, §1, p. 1:5-7. The suit was brought to recover for 
the government's negligent supervision in the manufacture, packaging and shipment of 
fertilizer with volatile qualities. The Court denied a cause of action because the negli-
gence occurred at a high governmental level, called the "planning" or "cabinet" level, and 
was excepted under the "discretionary functions" clause. See also note 9 infra. 
8 "It [the act] did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure or carelessness 
of public firemen does not create private actionable rights .... [I]f anything is doc-
trinally sanctified in the law of torts it is the immunity of communities and other public 
bodies for injuries due to fighting fire." Dalehite v. United States, note 7 supra, at 43-44. 
The Court felt Feres v. United States, note 4 supra, was controlling. 
9 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2680 (a). This provision excepts the liability of the government 
for any claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee of 
the Government .... " Clearly, in Dalehite the Court did not immunize the Coast Guard 
while fighting fires because that activity is discretionary, but rather because it is govern-
mental as opposed to proprietary. See note 8 supra. For an interesting discussion see 
Peck, "The Federal Tort Claims Act, A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Func-
tion Exception," 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956). 
10 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) noted in 54 MICH. L. REv. 
875 (1956). Plaintiff recovered for damages incurred as a result of the Coast Guard's 
negligence in maintaining a lighthouse. There is no analogous liability in private tort 
law. The Court stated, at 67, that it would be "attributing bizarre motives to Congress ... 
to hold that it was predicating liability on such a completely fortuitous circumstance-
the presence or absence of identical private activity." Justice Frankfurter for the major-
ity described (at p. 65) the "governmental-proprietary" distinction as a "quagmire that 
has long plagued the law of municipal corporations," and which is "inherently unsound." 
11 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, note 10 supra, at 64-65. 
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exceptions and safeguards.12 Had it intended that governmental activity 
at the "operational" level should retain its traditional immunity, the scope 
of the act would be quite narrow.is The Court felt that Congress intended 
for the United States to be ~iable if the State of Washington would im-
pose liability on private persons under "similar," though not identical, 
circumstances.14 
James M. Porter, S.Ed. 
12 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2680. . 
13 The interpretation of the "discretionary functions" exception as set down in Dale-
hite v. United States, note 7 supra, immunizes the government for negligence at a high 
"planning or cabinet" level, where policy decisions are made. If governmental activity 
at the operational level, where policy decisions are carried out, was also immunized by 
application of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction, there would be a very narrow 
spectrum of liability, e.g., "proprietary-operational" functions, and "non-discretionary" 
acts at the planning level. 
14 While this conclusion greatly extends the scope of recovery under the act, it can-
not be doubted that Congress intended such broad liability. The Court in the principal 
case, at 320, said: "Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are 
charged against the public treasury they ·are in effect spread among all those who con-
tribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden is rela-
tively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him 
destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this 
would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by 
Goverpment employees." See generally H. Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary 
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 11 (1942). 
